



Chapter 1: Introduction

Protecting a Unique Resource

The Battle of Brandywine was one of the earliest and largest combat actions of the Revolutionary War. Despite ongoing development pressures, the Brandywine Battlefield still retains many significant features it had in 1777, such as historic buildings and open spaces that were crossed by troops. Unlike the battles in Boston or New York City, Brandywine was fought in a rural setting of farms and small villages, some of which still exist. There is also a rare cultural continuity in the Battlefield. The very same Quaker meetinghouses that served as hospitals after the Battle are still used for worship. The ancestors of those Quakers still live in the area. Simply put, the Brandywine Battlefield possesses a special authenticity that can serve as the foundation for the protection of open space, and is also essential in promoting historic-based tourism. The Brandywine Battlefield is truly one-of-a-kind cultural landscape.

Tourism is a key component of the Brandywine Valley economy. Recent studies demonstrate that *heritage-based* tourism tends to produce higher spending per visitor than other forms of tourism.¹ According to a national study, tourists visiting historic sites stay longer and spend more money. A 2009 study found that 78 percent of all U.S. leisure travelers participated in cultural or heritage activities while traveling, contributing more than \$192 billion annually to the U.S. economy.² On an annual basis, heritage tourism in Pennsylvania generates about \$2.9 billion in terms of economic and fiscal impact, supporting 37,000 jobs and generating \$90 million in state tax revenue.³ Preserving the Brandywine Battlefield can therefore be a tool to grow the economy based on a resource that is unique to Chester and Delaware Counties.



Although the Battlefield hosts many significant historic resources, many of it is residential communities must deal with typical modern land use issues.

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¹ Econsult Corporation, *The Economic Benefits of Historic Preservation Activities in Pennsylvania*, (Harrisburg, PA: Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission and Preservation Pennsylvania, December 2011).

² Laura Mandala, *New Study Reveals Popularity of U.S. Cultural and Heritage Travel: Large, Affluent Market Focuses on History and Tradition*, (Washington, DC: U.S. Cultural & Heritage Tourism Marketing Council, October 21, 2009) www.uscht.com, accessed 2013.

³ Econsult Corporation. *The Economic Benefits of Historic Preservation Activities in Pennsylvania*.

The Battlefield as a Cultural Landscape

At dawn on September 11, 1777, some 15,000 British and Hessian troops under the command of Gen. William Howe marched east from Kennett Square Borough towards the village of Chadds Ford, where Gen. George Washington had gathered over 14,000 soldiers and militiamen.⁴ By sundown, Howe had forced Washington to retreat, but not to surrender, in what would be called the “Battle of Brandywine.” This day-long series of troop movements and firefights covered 35,000 acres of Chester and Delaware Counties in Pennsylvania. Brandywine was one of the two largest battles of the Revolutionary War. It was the first major engagement of the Philadelphia Campaign of 1777, which included combat at Paoli and Germantown. A detailed description of the Battle and its role in the Campaign of 1777 is presented in *Appendix A*. A detailed discussion of the significance of the Battle is presented in *Chapter 3*.

The Brandywine Battlefield is somewhat unique for a historic battlefield because it is not a compact combat zone. Instead, it extends through 15 municipalities in two counties where people still live and work, as shown on *Map 1.1*. The Battlefield includes colonial era buildings and historic resources, but also natural features and non-physical elements like the Chester County Quakers who lived in the Battlefield in 1777, and still live there today.



The tavern in Marshalltown was a gathering place for American militiamen during the Battle. The village still remains as a community center.

Because of its historic, natural, and cultural attributes, the Battlefield can be viewed as a “cultural landscape.” This Plan will address these diverse features by focusing on the following key components: land conservation, public access, historic resources, and historic interpretation which includes education, tourism, and historic preservation-based economic benefits. It will also provide recommendations, priorities, and a general cost estimate for implementing the recommendations. This Plan is meant to be the foundation for further, more detailed studies. It is not meant to be adopted as an element of a comprehensive plan by the municipalities or counties through which the Battlefield extends.

THE NEED FOR A PRESERVATION PLAN


The historical significance of the Battle of Brandywine has been well documented in scholarly publications dating back to the 19th century.⁵ In 1996, the significance of the Battlefield was formally recognized in a study initiated by the U. S. Congress under PL 104-333. By this action,

⁴ Smith, Samuel, *The Battle of Brandywine*, (Monmouth Beach, NJ: Philip Freneau Press, 1976), 3.

⁵ For examples, see Mark Boatner, *Encyclopedia of the American Revolution*, (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1994, 1974, 1966).

Congress authorized the National Park Service (NPS) to gather current information about the significance of, current condition of, and threats to Revolutionary War and War of 1812 sites, and to present preservation and interpretation alternatives for these sites.

In December 2000, an NPS Study Advisory Committee completed an evaluation of the relative significance of 2,748 historic sites from the Revolutionary War and the War of 1812. This evaluation was published in *The Report to Congress on the Historic Preservation of the Revolutionary War and War of 1812 Sites in the United States*. The *Report* identified the Brandywine Battlefield as one of the nation's 30 Priority 1 Battlefields, which are those with the highest threat level.⁶ The *Report* designated the Battlefield as having a "Low Short Term Threat" and a "Medium Long Term Threat," with a Significance Category of "Class-A Site of military or naval action with a vital objective or result that shaped the strategy, direction, outcome, or perception of the war."⁷



The Report to Congress on the Historic Preservation of the Revolutionary War and War of 1812 Sites in the United States features the Battlefield on its cover.

The *Report* was completed by a division of the NPS known as the American Battlefield Protection Program (ABPP). It was created in 1991 by the Secretary of the Interior as a federal partnership initiative to help communities identify, assess, and protect our nation's historic battlefields. The ABPP program mission states in part that "Battlefields honor those who fought and died for their ideals, their homes, and their families. It also ensures that both the tragedies of war and our nation's hard-won advances are never forgotten."



This page from the 2010 ABPP Survey shows how aerial photography and digital mapping were used to evaluate historic resources within the Battlefield.

The ABPP provides grant funding for battlefield study and protection projects. In 2009, Chester County received a grant from the ABPP to complete a *Historic Resource Atlas* of the Battle area and to develop an animated map of troop movements and battle action using digital mapping. Chester County staff worked in association with municipal historical commission volunteers and completed that project in December 2010. The result of this work was the *2010 Battle of Brandywine: Historic Resource Survey and Animated Map* (2010 ABPP Survey) which is discussed in detail in **Chapter**

⁶ US Senate and House of Representatives, *Report to Congress on the Historic Preservation of the Revolutionary War and War of 1812 Sites in the United States*, (Washington, D. C.: National Park Service, 2000), 46 and 53.

⁷ US Senate, *Report to Congress*, 24.

3. In 2011, the Chester County Planning Commission (CCPC) was awarded a grant from the APBB to complete a Battlefield Preservation Plan for the Brandywine Battlefield. The plan you are now reading is the result of this grant.

Plan Guidelines

This plan follows the guidelines set forth in the NPS memorandum, *Guidance for Developing a Battlefield Preservation Plan*, revised in October 2011. This memorandum lists factors that should be addressed in any Battlefield Preservation Plan. These thirteen factors are addressed in the chapters of this plan as noted below:

1. **The historical significance of the Battle and the Battlefield.** This is addressed in *Chapter 1*, and in *Chapter 3* as set forth in the Statement of Significance.
2. **The location and geographical area of the Battlefield.** This issue has already been addressed by the 2010 ABPP Survey, and is also addressed in *Chapter 1*.
3. **Cultural and natural resources on and within the Battlefield.** Cultural resources are identified in *Chapter 3*. Natural resources are addressed in the *Chapter 1* (soils and geology), *Chapter 2* (slopes, biotic, and water resources), and *Chapter 4* (topography).
4. **Current condition of the Battlefield.** This is discussed in *Chapter 2*.
5. **Brief history of Battlefield protection efforts.** This is addressed in *Chapter 2*.
6. **Current land use of the Battlefield and its immediate surroundings.** This is addressed in *Chapter 2*.
7. **Short- and long-term threats.** This is discussed in *Chapter 2*.
8. **Community characteristics.** General characteristics are presented in *Chapter 2*, and those that deal with historic interpretation and tourism are addressed in *Chapter 5*.
9. **Planning capabilities and past performance of local governments with jurisdiction over the Battlefield.** This is addressed *Chapters 2* and *3*.
10. **Priority parcels needing protection.** This is presented in *Chapters 2* and *3*.
11. **Analysis of the most effective land protection methods available for protection of the Battlefield.** Methods for protecting parcels of land as open space are discussed in *Chapter 2*. Methods for protecting historic resources through municipal ordinances and regulations are addressed in *Chapter 3*.
12. **Attitudes of the local community, local elected officials, and Battlefield landowners towards Battlefield protection.** This is addressed in the public involvement discussion presented at the end of *Chapters 2, 3, 4*, and *5*.
13. **Partnerships, strategies, and actions to protect the Battlefield.** This is noted in *Chapter 4* in relation to local governments and in *Chapter 5* in relation to other entities.

WHAT IS A CULTURAL LANDSCAPE?

There are a number of state and federal programs that can be used to preserve historic resources and landscapes. Federal initiatives include the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966, the National Register of Historic Places, and the Section 106 review process. State initiatives include Pennsylvania History Code (Title 37), the Historic District Act of 1961 (Act 167), and the Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code of 1968 (Act 247). These planning tools will be discussed in *Chapter 3*. However, it is important to introduce the concept of a *cultural landscape* and the notion that the Battlefield should be viewed as one.

According to the NPS, a *cultural landscape* can range from “thousands of acres of rural tracts of land to a small homestead with a front yard of less than one acre. Like historic buildings and districts, these special places reveal aspects of our country's origins and development through their form and features and the ways they were used. Cultural landscapes also reveal much about our evolving relationship with the natural world.” A cultural landscape is defined as “a geographic area, including both cultural and natural resources and the wildlife or domestic animals therein, associated with a historic event, activity, or person or exhibiting other cultural or aesthetic values.” There are four general types of cultural landscapes, not mutually exclusive: historic designed landscapes, historic vernacular landscapes, ethnographic landscapes, and historic sites. A *historic site* is defined as a “landscape significant for its association with a historic event, activity, or person. Examples include battlefields and president's house properties.”⁸



Preserving these wetlands near Chadds Ford protects a natural resources and an area of key strategic importance to the Battle of Brandywine.

This plan will demonstrate how the Brandywine Battlefield is not simply a collection of historically significant buildings and landscapes, but rather a cultural landscape encompassing historic, cultural, and natural resources that relate to the Battle. For example, the wetlands that still fringe the Brandywine Creek at Chadds Ford are the “morass” described by the British and American armies who had to cross or avoid them. The Quaker meetinghouses that served as hospitals during and after active combat are still standing. Some are still actively used. The residential and commercial centers in the Battlefield such as Chadds Ford and Marshallton, still exist as thriving communities. Thus, efforts to preserve and interpret the Battlefield cannot attempt to duplicate a kind of outdoor, undeveloped “museum,” like Gettysburg National Park. Rather, the Battlefield is a cultural landscape where residents must take an active role because the Battlefield is, in some cases, quite literally *in their own back yards*.

⁸ Charles A. Birnbaum, *Preservation Brief 36: Protecting Cultural Landscapes Planning, Treatment and Management of Historic Landscapes*, (Washington, DC: National Park Service, September, 1994), online edition <http://www.nps.gov/history/hps/tps/briefs/brief36.htm>, accessed October 2012.

THE GEOGRAPHIC BOUNDARIES OF THE BATTLEFIELD

Until the current century, there was no definitive mapping of the boundaries of the Battlefield, which is addressed in detail in *Chapter 5*. To local residents, the Battlefield has been loosely defined as anywhere that troops engaged in active combat, firing rifles or cannons. However, there were other non combat sites, such as houses used as general headquarters, which were also associated with the Battle. Furthermore, the state maintains a property in Chadds Ford, PA known as “Brandywine Battlefield Park.” It covers just a fraction of the area covered by the Battle. Over the years, numerous publications included battlefield maps, many of which were not always consistent with each other.



The battlefield is located about 30 miles west of “Old City” Philadelphia which was the city’s center during the 18th century.

It was only in 2010 that the boundary of the Battlefield was finally delineated based on well-researched military analysis of the Battle. The 2010 ABPP Survey surveyed the Battlefield’s historic resources based upon the US Armed Forces battlefield analysis technique for evaluating modern combat actions as described in *Chapter 3*. This analysis considered features such as topography, forests, swamps, and stream crossings as shown on *Map 1.2*.



The animated map created through the 2010 ABPP Survey is now used as an interactive display at the Chadds Ford Historical Society.

The KOCO analysis also addressed “engagement areas” where combat occurred, and routes taken by troops marching into battle as seen on *Map 1.3*. The analysis also considered properties behind the lines used to store supplies or as bases for non-combatants and “camp followers.” The results of the KOCO analysis were used to generate a digital animated map of troop movements over current and historic landscape features, as summarized on *Map 1.4*. The boundary for the Battlefield was then determined based on the analysis of troop movements as well as the locations of historic resources which were mostly buildings but also the fords crossed or guarded by troops. This boundary demarcation is also presented on *Map 1.4*, and is found on most of the maps in this plan. The KOCO information was then used to generate a map (*Map 1.5*) that was displayed at the Brandywine Battlefield Park, a state-owned facility.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE BATTLE

Chapter 3 of this plan includes a “Statement of Significance” for the Brandywine Battlefield. This statement is the core concept that guides the historic inventory presented in this chapter. It focuses on three key themes which make the Battlefield historically significant but also unique among the Revolutionary War era battlefields. These themes in chronological order are:

1. The conditions in the Brandywine Valley before the Battle which were created by civilians, most of whom were rural Quaker pacifists. This theme also involves how the Quakers influenced the Battle, and the role they played in its aftermath.
2. The events during the Battle on or about September 11, 1777.
3. The events after that Battle that were influenced by it. These included other battles that were part of the Campaign of 1777 in which the British succeeded in taking the rebels’ capital at Philadelphia. These later events also included diplomatic negotiations with the French.

In the past, popular histories of the Battle of Brandywine tended to focus mostly on the second of the above three themes, with less emphasis on the Battle’s geopolitical or civilian impacts. However, the following sections provide basic background information on all three themes.

The Quaker Settlement of the Brandywine Valley⁹



Inset from *The Treaty of Penn with the Indians*, (1771-1772), Benjamin West.¹⁰

The Battle primarily took place on farms and villages settled by Quakers. The homes used as officer’s headquarters and the houses of worship that served as hospitals were mostly owned by Quakers. Thus, it is essential to understand the Quaker settlement of the Brandywine Valley in order to put the Battle into cultural and geographic context. Furthermore, the Brandywine Valley still remains home to a significant population of Quakers, many of whom are descendants of the community that lived there in 1777. The Quaker congregations, around whose meetinghouses the Battle was fought, are still in operation.

Some even continue to worship in the very same buildings that stood in 1777.

⁹ The following section is largely based on an undated 2011 memorandum authored by Karen Marshall, the Heritage Preservation Coordinator for Chester County Parks and Recreation.

¹⁰ Source: Pennsylvania Academy of Fine Arts, Philadelphia, Public Domain, commons wikipedia.org, accessed October, 2012.


Settlement before the Quakers - Prior to the arrivals of settlers from Europe and Africa, the Brandywine Valley was inhabited by the Lenni Lenape who typically lived near navigable streams.¹¹ The first European settlement of the region was “Fort Christina” established by the Swedish West India Company in 1638 near present day Wilmington, DE.

By 1643, the Swedish Colony of New Sweden was established near Upland, PA. In 1655, Swedish sovereignty ended with the defeat of Fort Casimir by the Dutch. In 1664, King Charles II of England granted to his brother James, Duke of York, territory covering what is now New York, New Jersey and parts of Pennsylvania and Delaware. In general, relations between settlers and native people were civil. Settlers viewed the Lenni Lenape as having a “system of social restraints which, except for the cruelties committed during war, produced a high degree of gentleness and harmony...”¹³

Quaker Emigration to Pennsylvania -

The Religious Society of Friends, commonly known as Quakers, was founded in England in 1652. Its members broke away from the Church of England to practice what they believed were the practices of the early church. For Quakers, the Meeting was the center of the community, spiritually, intellectually and economically. The Meeting included a library and a school as well as a place (the meetinghouse) conducive to the silent meeting for worship. Disputes were settled in the business sessions of the Meeting.¹⁴ From 1652 until the passage of the 1689 Act of Toleration, Quakers in England were unable to worship without fear of reprisal. Thus, they often met in houses, barns, and other buildings.¹⁵

Quaker settlement in Pennsylvania was initiated by William Penn (1644-1718), the son of an admiral in the Royal Navy. In 1670, Penn received a substantial inheritance including a debt



The Brandywine Creek Watershed, shown in tan, extends from central Chester County south through western Delaware County, PA and into the City of Wilmington, DE.¹²

¹¹ Paul Wallace, *Indians in Pennsylvania*, 2nd Ed., (Harrisburg: Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission, 1961, 2005), 28.

¹² Chester County Board of Commissioners, *Watersheds: An Integrated Water Resources Plan for Chester County Pennsylvania and Its Watersheds*, (West Chester, PA: Chester County Water Resources Authority, 2002), 17

¹³ Wallace, *Indians in Pennsylvania*, 7.

¹⁴ Howard Brinton, “Introduction: Friends for 300 Years,” *Quaker Roots: The Story of Western Quarterly Meeting of Philadelphia Yearly Meeting of the Religious Society of Friends*, (Kennett Square, PA, 1980).

¹⁵ Historic American Buildings Survey, *Silent Witness*, 3.

owed to his father by the King of England for outfitting “his fleet on one occasion at his own expense, during his years of active service.”¹⁶ In payment for the debt, Penn petitioned Charles II for a grant of unassigned land that would be named “Pennsylvania” after his father. Penn intended for his new colony to be a “holy experiment,” providing religious freedom for his chosen faith and the faith of others. He widely advertised news of his charter to Quakers in England, Ireland, Scotland, Wales, Germany, and Holland. Penn’s plan was to sell shares of Pennsylvania to those who would become known as “First Purchasers.”

Penn attracted, “neither the richest nor the poorest Europeans. Most were skilled, and, perhaps most importantly, most were the kind of people who sought individual satisfaction.”¹⁷ Favorable accounts of Pennsylvania were sent back to Europe urging others to come to, “the happy conditions existing in Pennsylvania – the great and good character of the Founder, his wise and liberal laws, his cheap and fertile land, the mild and healthful climate, the successful peace policy with the Indians which Penn adopted and above all his religious toleration.”¹⁸ He established three counties; Berks, Chester (now Chester and Delaware Counties), and Philadelphia (now Philadelphia and Montgomery Counties).

The Quakers in Pennsylvania were remarkably unified in belief and behavior. They were set apart from the wider culture by their many “testimonies,” notably their pacifism, and by the mid-18th century, their opposition to slavery. Quakers were marked by plain dress, plain speech, and simple architecture. They were able businessmen and supported institutions for the education and welfare of the population. Although Quakers were a minority of the population, they composed the majority of Pennsylvania’s government until 1756 when their unwillingness to appropriate funds for war, led most of them to withdraw from the legislature.¹⁹

Philadelphia, also known as the “Quaker City,” became the region’s focal point for shipping, commerce, and government. One of the key contributions to the rise of Philadelphia was the Quaker Yearly Meeting, whose importance rivaled that of the London Meeting. The importance of the political and financial control yielded by Philadelphia Quakers and their Yearly Meeting cannot be overstressed. It attracted prominent farmers and leaders who sought “silence and inspiration” but also the opportunity to “purchase imported goods



The annual Chadds Ford Days festival features aspects of 18th century life in the mostly Quaker Brandywine Valley.

¹⁶ Edwin Bronner, *William Penn’s “Holy Experiment:” The Founding of Pennsylvania 1681-1701* (New York: Temple University Publications, 1962), 22.

¹⁷ James Lemon, *Best Poor Man’s Country: Early Southeastern Pennsylvania*, (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press) 1972), 2.


¹⁸ Brinton, *Quaker Roots*, 3.

¹⁹Historic American Buildings Survey of the National Park Service, *Silent Witness: Quaker Meetinghouses in the Delaware Valley, 1695 to the Present*. (Philadelphia: Philadelphia Yearly Meeting of the Religious Society of Friends, 2002), 1.

and to negotiate loans with merchants.”²⁰ Quaker merchants established their own “patterns of trade within the British mercantile system” which gave them some autonomy from London.²¹ Corn, pork, beef, flaxseed, flour, wheat, and iron were all important exports.

A well planned transportation system was established throughout the rural communities surrounding Philadelphia to move goods and families to the Yearly Meeting. *Map 1.6* shows the Quaker Meetings in Chester County (which in 1777 included current day Delaware County). This map also shows a curved line known as Von Thunen’s Heavy Goods Limit. This line is a circle that is 33.6 miles away from a port (in this case Philadelphia), and represents one days travel by a farmer riding a cartload of produce to a regional market.²² This theory was developed by Johann Heinrich von Thunen (1783-1850) and is not universally accepted as valid. However, it supports the documented settlement pattern in which largely English Quaker farmers owned property within about 30 miles of Philadelphia (as shown in green on *Map 1.6*).

The area to the west of the Quaker settlement was ultimately settled by Germans, also known as the “Pennsylvania Dutch.” They immigrated after the Quakers and thus farmed lands farther away from Philadelphia. The Quakers and non-Quaker English held most of the land in the County, although there were the Welsh in the northeast, and the Scots-Irish to the far west.²⁴ Because Chester County is located between Philadelphia and the fertile lands to the west in present-day Lancaster and Berks Counties, it was a “crossroads” region, and even today it is crossed by the Pennsylvania Turnpike and US Route 202. In the colonial era there was a tavern almost every mile along the Lancaster Turnpike (current US Route 30). These taverns served as landmarks to travelers crossing through miles of largely undistinguishable farm fields. Thus these taverns would have been of interest to both Gen. Washington and Gen. Howe. The Great Nottingham Road (now US 1 or Baltimore Pike) was a major route leading from Chadds Ford to Philadelphia.



This map shows the highly productive soils of southeastern Pennsylvania in red, which cover most of Chester and Delaware Counties.²³

Quaker Agricultural and Milling - Historian James Lemon summarized the significance of Quaker culture in southeastern Pennsylvania by noting that, “Pennsylvania was a veritable paradise and refuge from oppression. Indeed, it could be said it was ‘the best poor man’s country in the world.’ Its style of life presaged the mainstream of nineteenth-century America with its conservative defense of liberal individualism, its population of mixed national and

²⁰ Lemon, *Best Poor Man’s County*, 129.

²¹ Lemon, *Best Poor Man’s County*, 125.

²² Lemon, *Best Poor Man’s County*, 193.

²³ USDA, Natural Conservation Resources Service, *General Soil Map of Pennsylvania*, (1972).

²⁴ Lemon, *Best Poor Man’s County*, 83.

religious origins, its dispersed farms, and farm-service villages.”²⁵ Much of the economic success of the Quakers was due to the highly productive agricultural soils found in southeastern Pennsylvania, including the Brandywine Valley. These high-quality soils are shown on *Map 1.7* along with parcels (in dark brown) that are currently farmed and enrolled in the PA Act 167. This Act provides farmers with protection from nuisance lawsuits and other benefits. To this day, the quality soils of the region still support profitable farm operations.

The Brandywine Valley also supported numerous Quaker owned mills, over 130 at the height of use. These mills were powered by fast flowing waters that course through the valley’s gently rolling topography. As *Map 1.8* shows, the geology of the Battlefield is characterized by hard, mostly metamorphic rock formations that have resulted in a combination of flat and sloping terrains. This topography is generally flatter to the north, gradually becoming hillier to the south. There are steep hillsides and cliffs along the lower reaches of the main stem of the Brandywine Creek.

The Strategic Significance of the Brandywine Quakers - In developing a strategy for the Battle, both Washington and Howe had to consider how the Brandywine Valley Quakers might assist or impede their plans. Quakers were not known for supporting military actions of any kind. Quakers refused to pay taxes for war, participate in government activities, or train with the local militia.

It was not unusual for Quakers to be expelled by their Meetings for advocating or taking part in the struggle for independence. One man was expelled for shoeing a cavalry horse. Before the Battle, the pacifist Quakers provided limited information or material support to either army. Both Howe and Washington used local guides who were, for all practical purposes, forced into service against their will.²⁶



The cultural importance of the Brandywine Valley’s historic mills is reflected in the millwheel that serves as a logo for the Brandywine River Museum.

Washington was keenly aware of the need to protect the Quaker flour mills. He asked the millers at Brandywine Village at the mouth of the Creek to hide their millstones, so that the British would not be able to ground flour for their troops.²⁷ Washington was also aware that the Quaker forges and furnaces in the northern Brandywine Valley provided the armaments he needed to wage the war. Thus the mills and forges of Brandywine Valley were as important to Washington’s overall strategy as the ports and markets of Philadelphia.

²⁵ James T. Lemon, *The Best Poor Man’s County*, xxiii.

²⁶ J. Futhey and G. Cope, *History of Chester County, Pennsylvania, with Genealogical and Biographical Sketches*, (Philadelphia: Louis H. Everts, 1881), 78.

²⁷ Henry Conrad, *History of the State of Delaware, Vol. 2* (Wilmington, DE: Self Published, 1908), 418.



The old Kennett Square Meetinghouse was a community center in 1777. It was also a strategic battle site where combat occurred early in the Battle.

One of Gen. Howe's major concerns was feeding his massive army as they marched from Elk, Maryland north into Chester County's Great Valley, and then east toward Philadelphia. Thus it is understandable why he chose to march through the productive farmland of the Brandywine Valley and its well used roads that led to Philadelphia. Some of the supplies he needed were simply seized from sometimes uncooperative Quakers, while others had to be purchased.

Howe also sought to entice area farmers to accept British currency versus Continental funds as a form of economic warfare. Selling produce to the British kept that very same food from being delivered to the Americans. While Howe was occupying Philadelphia during the winter of 1777, he used this as a tool to reduce food stores for Washington's troops camped in nearby Valley Forge. The fact that some civilians were open to selling to the British led rebels to complain that "many disaffected persons are willing to be flogged" if they can make money.²⁸

The Quaker's food and materials were also seized by the Americans. In a sense, it can be argued that the Brandywine Quakers were invaded by two "foreign" armies: the British and the non-Quaker Americans. Since the Quakers were a literate community, there are abundant detailed inventories of precisely what was taken from them by British and American troops. Accounts of battle-related "sufferings" experienced by Quakers were also written down in meetinghouse records. Since no one was sure who would win the war, civilians were never certain that they would ever get reimbursed. After all, the victors might not honor debts incurred by the vanquished. But the Quakers were not entirely driven by economic interests. The same Quakers who gave the soldiers a cold welcome, later cared for those wounded in the Battle. Quakers turned their meetinghouses into hospitals and when necessary buried the dead.

THE PHILADELPHIA CAMPAIGN OF 1777

The Battle of Brandywine was but one of a number of battles and skirmishes that took place in 1777 as part of what has become known as the Philadelphia Campaign. The major movements of the campaign are shown in *Map 1.9*, while the events in Chester and Delaware Counties are shown on both *Maps 1.10* and *1.11*. The summary of the Philadelphia Campaign presented below comes from the *Encyclopedia of American History*, 7th edited by J. Morris and R. Morris.²⁹


²⁸ Lemon, *Best Poor Man's County*, 5.

²⁹ J. Morris and R. Morris, eds., *Encyclopedia of American History*, 7th Ed. (New York;Harper Collins, 1996), 106-110.

Events Leading up to the Campaign

Events of 1776 - On July 4, 1776 the Thirteen Colonies declared their independence. One month later, 30,000 British troops including 9,000 German mercenaries known as “Hessians,” landed in New York. They joined forces already stationed there, under the command of Gen. Howe. Battles during 1776 at Long Island, Harlem Heights, and White Plains all went to the British. The Continental Army fled across New Jersey into Pennsylvania. Washington’s Christmas day attack on Trenton, and a British loss at Princeton in January 1777, forced Howe to retreat to New York City for the winter, while Washington camped in Morristown, NJ.

Burgoyne’s Proposal and Howe’s Plan - The plan for the Campaign was developed by British Maj. Gen. John Burgoyne in February 1777. He submitted the plan to Lord George Germain, Secretary of State for the Colonies. The original concept called for a three pronged attack. Burgoyne would lead an army south from Canada into the Hudson Valley. An auxiliary force would march east along the Mohawk Valley from Oswego, NY, and join Burgoyne's troops. A third force under Howe would march north up the Hudson Valley from New York City. Lord Germain agreed to Burgoyne’s plan, but soon after also accepted a plan developed by Howe to attack Philadelphia by sea, and after securing it, join Burgoyne in New York.



John Burgoyne, British Army Officer during the American Revolutionary War (ca. 1924-34), Geo. Washington Bicentennial Commission.³⁰

Battles and Events during the Campaign

Howe Sails to Maryland - In July 1777, Gen. Howe’s army of some 15,000 men embarked from New York City on 260 ships, with the intention of sailing up the Delaware River and laying siege to Philadelphia (See *Map 1.9*). This was the largest armada ever assembled in America. After Howe’s ships were well out to sea, British scouts sent word that the Delaware Bay was quite well defended. As a result, Howe decided to sail up the Chesapeake Bay and attack Philadelphia from the south and west. In August of 1777, Howe’s force, now reduced to 200 ships, landed in what is now Elkton Maryland, initiating the largest movement of troops in the Revolutionary War and the last encounter between Washington and Howe.

Washington Marches to Chadds Ford - Upon finding out the British were attacking from Maryland, Gen. Washington, who was camped in Wilmington, DE, sent troops west to harass the British. There was a skirmish at Cooches Bridge, south of Newark, DE (See *Map 1.10*). After Howe marched his army north, the Americans took steps to oppose a British attack on Philadelphia from the west. Thus, Washington positioned his army along the east branch of the Brandywine Creek near Chadds Ford.

³⁰ Source: National Archives, wikipedia.org, accessed October, 2012. Public Domain.

The Battle of Brandywine - On September 11, 1777, Howe's army launched a two-prong attack. One column departed Kennett Square along the Great Nottingham Road (current US Route 1), and attacked Washington's troops (See *Map 1.11-A*). A second column traveled north from Kennett Square, and then turned east and forded the Creek near what is now a bridge at old Jefferis Ford. They arrived at an area near Birmingham Road in Birmingham Township (See *Map 1.11-B*). From there they attacked Washington's northern flank from behind (See *Map 1.11-E*). The American troops were out maneuvered. Gen. Washington then retreated east along US Route 1 (See *Map 1.11-H*). His forces reformed near the City of Chester in what is now Delaware County.

Washington Regroups - Following the Battle, Howe's army rested for a few days then marched north in two columns. The western column, composed mostly of Hessian troops, marched into what is now West Chester Borough. The eastern column went north up present day PA Route 352 (See *Map 1.10*). Meanwhile, Washington's forces made their way to Philadelphia to reorganize. They then marched west along US Route 30 past the General Warren Inn. Washington established his headquarters near there at Malin Hall on Swedesford Road and PA Route 29. His troops camped along Swedesford Road between Malin Hall and the White Horse Inn.



It is likely that Hessian Troops marched across this street in central West Chester Borough on their way from Chadds Ford to the "Battle of the Clouds."

The "Battle of the Clouds" - By now, both sides generally knew each other's location. Howe's western column marched through West Chester, while Cornwallis led the bulk of the British army north on PA Route 352 (See *Map 1.10*). On September 16, 1777, Washington lined up his troops south of King Road near present day Immaculata College. The Americans were still organizing when 5,000 Hessians hit their western flank. Soon after, some 13,000 British forces charged the Americans other side. However, a torrential rainstorm put an end to active combat because the flint lock muskets could not fire with wet powder. There were only eleven American casualties, but it became clear to Washington that he had fallen into a trap. As the Americans retreated, the mud in the rain-soaked dirt roads stopped the British from advancing.

The Battle of Paoli - The Americans retreated north to Warwick Furnace (See *Map 1.10*). The next day, Hessian mercenaries under Lt. Gen. Knyphausen joined with the forces commanded by Maj. Gen. Cornwallis. The combined army camped at "Truduffrin," south of Valley Forge in current day Tredyffrin Township. Meanwhile, Washington had sent Brig. Gen. Anthony Wayne and a force of 1,500 men to secretly return to the woods south of the Paoli Tavern in Malvern to harass the British. The British learned of this, and on September 20, 1777 some 5,000 British troops surprised Wayne's camp in a pre-dawn bayonet attack. Wayne's troops fled, leaving 71 captured and 53 killed, some while sleeping, in what came to be known as the "Paoli Massacre."

Howe Captures Philadelphia - After chasing away Wayne's forces, Howe marched east to Valley Forge Village on the Schuylkill River (See *Map 1.10*). He feigned an attack on Washington's troops by marching upstream. Washington, whose supply of gunpowder (wrapped in paper-covered musket cartridges) was largely ruined in the Battle of the Clouds downpour, retreated northward. Howe then reversed his army, crossed the Schuylkill and marched to Philadelphia. He captured the City with minimal opposition on September 26, 1777, and remained there instead of marching north to join Maj. Gen. Burgoyne.



*Anthony Wayne (1745–1796),
American General, (c. 19th century),
Anonymous Artist.³¹*

The Battle of Germantown - On October 3, 1777, the Continental army attempted to retake Philadelphia at the Battle of Germantown, but was defeated (See *Map 1.10*). As winter approached, Washington marched his army north to Whitemarsh in Montgomery County, and then along the Schuylkill River Valley to Valley Forge, a strategic high ground. The Continental Army remained there from December 17, 1777 until June 19, 1778. During this time, Washington managed to hold together his demoralized, ill-equipped and sometimes hungry army, confounding critics on both sides who expected large-scale desertions. The period of encampment also gave Washington time to train his army using one unified set of rules and regulations. Prior to that, the troops in state brigades or militia each had their own rules and regulations, which had caused some of the confusion at Brandywine and Germantown.


Other Events Associated with the Campaign

Burgoyne Invades the Hudson Valley - In June 1777, Burgoyne had marched 7,000 troops south down the Hudson Valley from St. Johns Canada, and within weeks took Ft. Ticonderoga and Ft. Ann from the Americans (See *Map 1.9*). In August, 1,800 British and Native American troops under British Col. Barry St. Ledger marched west along the Mohawk Valley but after besieging Ft. Stanwick, were forced to retreat. Meanwhile, Burgoyne was running desperately low on supplies. His attempts to seize stores at Bennington, VT failed. He march on to Albany, NY and requested aid from British Maj. Gen. Clinton stationed in New York City. Clinton sent a fleet up the Hudson in October, but it turned back never reaching Burgoyne.

Burgoyne Surrenders at Saratoga - Throughout October and September, American Col. Horatio Gates had gathered local New York militiamen, reinforcing his army in the Hudson Valley to over 6,000 men. In September, Burgoyne's attempt to attack the American forces at Freemans Farm failed, and he fell back to Bemis Heights where he was again defeated by American Maj. Gen. Benedict Arnold (See *Map 1.10*). Burgoyne withdrew once more to Saratoga, where he was surrounded by a force three times larger than his own. On October 17, 1777 he surrendered, having never received reinforcements from Gen. Howe. The 5,700 men under Burgoyne's command laid down their arms. They were marched to Boston, and shipped back to England.

³¹ Source: US Library of Congress, Public Domain, wikipedia.org, accessed October, 2012.

Diplomatic Initiatives with the French - In December of 1777, the British Prime minister received news of Burgoyne's surrender and offered terms of reconciliation to America's Ambassador to France, Benjamin Franklin. Franklin rejected the terms since they did not allow for full independence. Instead Franklin notified Foreign Minister Comte de Vergennes that the Americans had thoroughly defeated Burgoyne and had failed to be destroyed by the better trained troops of Howe. This convinced Comte de Vergennes that the Americans could win the war and so warranted French support and loans.³³



Portrait of Charles Gravier de Vergennes (1717-1787), (c. 1785), Vangelisti Vincenzo³²

This positive assessment of the American army, along with fears that the British might ask the colonies to remain part of the United Kingdom, led the French to recognize the United States as an independent nation. In January 1778, Comte de Vergennes agreed to a trade agreement with the Americans and promised to become military allies if war were to break out between Britain and France. It did on June 17, 1778. The French then provided naval and ground troop support to the Americans, culminating with an American victory at Yorktown in 1781, thus ending the War.

A SUMMARY OF THE BATTLE OF BRANDYWINE

In describing the Philadelphia Campaign, historian Michael Stephenson wrote, "Of all the campaigns of the war, none is as confusing, when it comes to intention and execution..."³⁴ John Trussell noted that the Campaign's first battle at Brandywine, "provides a classic example of the difficulties stemming from the well known, "fog of war," deriving in this case from the incomplete and inaccurate terrain information, conflicting reports of enemy movements, and... too stubborn adherence to a preconception regarding the deduced intentions of the enemy."³⁵

Troop Units and Types of Troops

The troops that participated in the Battle of Brandywine are listed by unit in *Figures 1.2* and *1.3*. To understand their role and location during the Battle, it is necessary to define the terms used to describe them, like *battalion* and *brigade*. Such terms have changed definitions over time, and so a *brigade* during the Revolutionary War may be somewhat different than it is now. Furthermore, from 1775 to 1783, a *regiment* consisted of one *battalion* and so the two terms were virtually synonymous.³⁶ Lastly, some of the troops were *combatants*, who engaged in combat while others were *non-combatants*, who provided support from behind the lines.

³² Source: US Library of Congress, wikipedia.org, accessed October, 2012. Public Domain,

³³ Thomas Fleming, *Liberty: The American Revolution*, (New York: Viking, 1997), 269-274.

³⁴ Stephenson, Michael. *Patriot Battles: How the War of Independence Was Fought*, (New York: Harper Collins, 2007), 267.

³⁵ Quoted in Smith, *The Battle of Brandywine*, 3.

³⁶ Boatner, *Encyclopedia of the American Revolution*, 63.

There were also civilian *camp followers*. They included artisans and craftsmen who served as contractors providing the soldiers with goods like candles, barrels, or clothing. There were commonly women among the camp followers, some of whom were soldier's wives. They served as cooks, washerwomen, and other occupations common to women at the time. Although these non-combatants were not on the front lines, they were sometimes exposed to live fire and therefore were in harm's way during battle. Some key military terms needed to understand the Battle are (from smallest to largest):



British Troops on the March, (1760), Anonymous Artist. This shows camp followers with children and women, one smoking a pipe.³⁷

Patrol - a small unit sent out from a company for a specific task, usually 25 men.³⁸

Company - the smallest organizational element of the US Army that is authorized to have a commander. It consists of between 40 and 250 soldiers. During the Revolutionary War a company typically consisted of 50 men.³⁹

Battalion - At the time of the Revolution, the standard battalion was composed of 10 companies.⁴⁰ At Brandywine, the Hessian Grenadiers had three battalions of roughly 435 men each.⁴¹

Regiment - A British regiment consisted of two or more battalions.⁴² At Brandywine, Stirn's Hessian Brigade had four regiments, each of which had between 460 to 600 men. The American regiments at Brandywine ranged from 21 to 339 men, but most were in the 150 to 250 range.

Brigade - A military formation of two or more regiments.⁴³ At Brandywine, the British 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Brigades each had between 1,300 to 1,500 men, while Stirn's Hessian Brigade had just over 2,000 men.

Other key terms referring to the type of soldiers within a unit were:

Dragoons - Soldiers who rode on horses like cavalry, but generally fought dismounted.⁴⁴

Grenadiers - A "flank company" which was positioned on the flanks (or sides) of a battle line. They were developed during the Thirty Years War (1618-1748) and were composed of large powerful men who threw "hand bombs." By the time of the Revolution they were

³⁷ The Anne S. K. Brown Military Collection, Brown University Library, (Used by Permission, 2012).

³⁸ Matthew Borders, Historian, ABPP, (Personal communication, Nov. 2012).

³⁹ Matthew Borders, Historian, ABPP, (Personal communication, Nov. 2012)

⁴⁰ Boatner, *Encyclopedia of the American Revolution*, 63.

⁴¹ All the estimated troop numbers in these definitions come from Smith, *The Battle of Brandywine*, 29-31.

⁴² Boatner, *Encyclopedia of the American Revolution*, 63.

⁴³ Boatner, *Encyclopedia of the American Revolution*, 114.

⁴⁴ Terry Mays, *Historical Dictionary of the American Revolution*, (Lanham, MD: Sacrecrow, 2010), 96.

elite units who no longer threw grenades, but instead were used for important or hazardous combat missions.⁴⁵

Hessians - Almost 30,000 German mercenaries fought in the Revolutionary War on behalf of the British. They became known as *Hessians* because they were led by three successive commanders all of whom were from the State of Hesse, in Germany.⁴⁷ These mercenaries came from throughout Germany and would accept non-Germans into their ranks.

Jaegers - A unit of expert marksmen whose German name means “hunters.” They were generally used for special missions and as advance guards.⁴⁸ Their function was similar to that of British Rangers or American Riflemen.⁴⁹



Hessian 3rd Guard Regiment, (c. 1784), J. C. Muller. Hessian units included non-Germans such as the African drummer pictured in this etching.⁴⁶

Light Infantry – In the British army, the term “Light Infantry” was used to describe the highly mobile companies that were used for fighting skirmishes.⁵⁰ The Americans organized their first light infantry companies in 1775, and they were initially composed of **Riflemen**. The rifle, a weapon designed for hunting game, was a more accurate than a musket. The use of a rifle in warfare was a new military technology during the late 18th century as so a “Rifleman” was a soldier trained to use this innovative weapon.⁵¹

Militia - Part-time soldiers drawn from local communities, often with limited training, and subject only to state authorities. The British loyalist militias, known as “provincials,” were attached to units, and so had the status and competence of professional soldiers.⁵²

Pioneers - Were non-combat troops who used saws, axes, and shovels to set up, build, and break down camps and fortifications. They served as laborers for engineering units.⁵³

Rangers - A unit of British soldier specifically trained to operate in the rough terrain and wilderness conditions of North America. American troops were not organized as rangers, but some units functioned as rangers simply because of their experience fighting in woodlands.⁵⁴

⁴⁵ Boatner, *Encyclopedia of the American Revolution*, 457.

⁴⁶ The Anne S. K. Brown Military Collection, Brown University Library, (Used by Permission, 2012).

⁴⁷ Boatner, *Encyclopedia of the American Revolution*, 425.

⁴⁸ Boatner, *Encyclopedia of the American Revolution*, 549.

⁴⁹ Matthew Borders, Historian, ABPP, (Personal communication, Nov. 2012)

⁵⁰ Boatner, *Encyclopedia of the American Revolution*, 634.

⁵¹ Boatner, *Encyclopedia of the American Revolution*, 934-935.

⁵² Boatner, *Encyclopedia of the American Revolution*, 705-707.

⁵³ H. L. Scott, *Military Dictionary*, (New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1861), 463.

⁵⁴ Matthew Borders, Historian, ABPP, (Personal communication, Nov. 2012).

Figure 1.1: Gen. Howe's 15,006 British Troops⁵⁵

<i>DIVISION NAME: Commanding Officer (Estimated number of men, if known)</i>
LEFT DIVISION: Maj. Gen. Charles Cornwallis (8,241)
3rd Brigade Maj. Gen. Charles Grey (1,509) - 15th Regiment, under Lt. Col. John Bird (367); 17th Regiment, Lt. Col. Charles Mawhood (233); 42nd Regiment, Lt. Col. Thomas Stirling (597); and 44th Regiment, Maj. Henry Hope (312). 4th Brigade, Brig. Gen. James Agnew (1,383) - 33rd Regiment, Lt. Col. James Webster (368); 37th Regiment, Lt. Col. Robert Abercromby (308); 46th Regiment, Lt. Col. Enoch Markham (312); and 64th Regiment, (395). Guards Brig., Gen. Edward Matthew (887) - 1st Battalion, Lt. Col. Henry Trelawny and 2nd Battalion, Lt. Col. James Ogilvie. Light Infantry (1,130) - 1st Battalion, Lt. Col. Robert Abercromby and 2nd Battalion, Maj. John Maitland British Grenadiers (1,080) - 1st Battalion, Lt. Col. William Meadows and 2nd Battalion, Lt. Col. Henry Monckton. Hessian Grenadiers (1,307) - Linsing Battalion, Lt. Col. Christian von Linsing (437); Minnigerode Battalion, Lt. Col. Ludwig von Minnigerode (430); and Lengerke Battalion, Lt. Col. George Lengerke (440). Hessian Jaegers, Lt. Col. Ludwig von Wurmb (511). Light Dragoons, 16th Dragoons, 2 Squadrons (234). Artillery (est. 200).
RIGHT DIVISION: Lt. Gen. Wilhelm von Knyphausen (6,825)
1st Brigade (1330) - 4th Regiment, Lt. Col. James Ogilvie (356); 23rd Regiment, Lt. Col. Benjamin Bernard (353); 28th Regiment, Lt. Col. Robert Prescott (286); 49th Regiment, Lt. Col. Henry Calder (335) 2nd Brigade, Maj. Gen. James Grant (1494) - 5th Regiment, Lt. Col. William Walcott (307); 10th Regiment, Maj. John Vatass (312); 27th Regiment, Lt. Col. John Maxwell (324); 40th Regiment, Lt. Col. Thomas Musgrave (300); and 55th Regiment, (251). 71st Regiment, (922) - 1st Battalion, ; 2nd Battalion, Lt. Col. Archibald Campbell. Hessian brigade Maj. Gen. Johann Stirn (2162) - Leib (Du Corps) Regiment, Col. Friedrich von Wurmb (598); Mirbach Regiment, Lt. Col. Justus von Schieck (553); Donop Regiment, Lt. Col. Philip Heymell (544), and Combined Regiment, (467). Light Dragoons - 16th dragoons, 1 squadron (119). Queen's Rangers - Maj. James Wemys (398). English Riflemen - Capt. Patrick Ferguson (130). Artillery - Brig. Gen. Samuel Cleveland (est. 200).

⁵⁵ All troop numbers are estimates as presented in Smith, *The Battle of Brandywine*, 29-32.

Figure 1.2: Gen. Washington's 14,139 American Troops⁵⁶

<i>DIVISION NAME: Commanding Officer (Estimated number of men, if known)</i>
1st DIVISION: Maj. Gen. Nathanael Greene (1,731)
1st VA Brigade, Brig. Gen. Peter Muhlenberg - 1 st VA Reg., Col. Hendricks (120); 5 th VA Reg., Col. Parker (127); 9 th VA Reg., Col. Matthews (391); and 13 th VA Reg., Col. Russell . 2nd VA Brig., Brig. Gen. George Weedon - 2 nd VA Reg., Col. Spottswood (182); 6 th VA Reg., Col. Elliot (223); 10 th VA Reg., Col. Stevens (295); 14 th VA Reg., Col. Lewis ; PA Reg., Col. Stewart.
2nd DIVISION: Maj. Gen. Adam Stephen (1,711)
3rd VA Brigade, Brig. Gen. William Woodford - 3 rd VA Reg., Col. Marshall (150); 7 th VA Reg., Col. McClanachan (472); 11 th VA Reg., Lt. Col. Febiger (377); and 15 th VA Reg., Col Mason. 4th VA Brig., Brig. Gen. Charles Scott - 4 th VA Reg., Col. Lawson (314); 8 th VA Reg., Col. Bowman (157); 12 th VA Reg., Col. Wood (117); Grayson's Reg., Col. Grayson ; and Patton's Reg., Col. Patton (124).
3rd DIVISION: Maj. Gen. John Sullivan (1,308)
1st MD Brigade - 1 st MD Reg., Col. Stone (199); 3 rd MD Reg., Lt. Col. Ramsey (144); 6 th MD Reg., Lt. Col. Ford (118); DE Reg., Col. Hall (79); and 5 th MD Reg., two companies, Capt. Cosden. 2nd MD Brigade, Brig. Gen. Preudhomme de Borre - 2 nd MD Reg., Col. Price (118); 4 th MD Reg., Col. Hall (220); 7 th MD Reg., Col. Gunby (95); German Battalion, Col. Arendt (305); and Hazen's Reg., Col. Hazen, 2 battalions (393).
4th DIVISION: Brig. Gen. Anthony Wayne (1,640)
1st PA Brigade, Col. Thomas Hartley - 1 st PA Reg., Col. Chambers (335); 2 nd PA Reg., Col. Bicker (21); 7 th PA Reg., Lt. Col. Grier ; 10 th PA Reg., Col. Nagel (231); and Hartley's Reg., Lt. Col. Connor (155). 2nd PA Brigade, Col. Richard Humpton - 4 th PA Reg., Lt. Col. Butler (150); 5 th PA Reg., Col. Johnston (241); 8 th PA Reg., Col. Brodhead (369); and 11 th PA Reg., Maj. Mentges (138).
5th DIVISION: Maj. Gen. William Alexander, a.k.a Stirling (1,798)
3rd PA Brigade, Brig. Gen. Thos. Conway - 3 rd PA Reg. Col. Craig (150); 6 th PA Reg. Lt. Col. Harmar; 9 th PA Reg. Maj. Nichols (193); 12 th PA Reg. Col. Cooke (231); and Spencer's NJ Reg. Col. Spencer (186). NJ Brigade - 1 st NJ Reg. Col. Ogden (184); and 3 rd NJ Reg. Col. Dayton (300). Light Infantry Brigade, Brig. Gen. William Maxwell - Continental detachments ; and 8 th Battalion, Chester Co. PA Militia. NC Brigade, Brig. Gen. Francis Nash - 1 st NC Reg. Col. Clark ; 2 nd NC Reg. Col. Martin; 3 rd NC Reg. Col. Summer ; 4 th NC Reg. Lt. Col. Thackston ; and 5 th NC Reg. , 6 th NC Reg. Lt. Col. William Taylor; 7 th NC Reg. Col. Hogan 8 th NC Reg. Lt. Col. Lockhart; and 9 th NC Reg. Light Dragoons - Reg., Col. Bland; Reg., Col. Sheldon; Reg., Lt. Col. Byrd; and Reg., Lt. Col. White. Artillery Brigade, Brig. Gen. Henry Knox - PA Reg.; Col. Procter (251); NJ Companies, Cpts. Clark and Randall (55); NY Companies, Cpts. Bauman and Doughty (73); Continental Reg., Col. Lamb (399); MA Reg., Col. John Crane (497); and Misc. Companies, Cpts. Lee, Porter, and Jones (95).

⁵⁶ All troop numbers are estimates as presented in Smith, *The Battle of Brandywine*, 29-32.

Figure 1.2: Gen. Washington's 14,139 American Troops (Continued)

<i>DIVISION NAME: Commanding Officer (Estimated number of men, if known)</i>
PENNSYLVANIA MILITIA DIVISION: Maj. Gen. John Armstrong (2,973)
1st PA Brigade, Brig. Gen. Potter - Philadelphia Reg., Col. Moor; Philadelphia Reg., Col. McVaugh; Bucks Reg., Maj. Folwell; Lancaster Reg., Col. Watson; Berks Regt., Col. Hunter; York Reg., Col. Thomson; and Cumberland Reg., Col. Dunlap 2nd PA Brigade, Brig. Gen. James Irvine - Philadelphia Reg., Lt. Col. Smith; Chester Reg., Col. Evans; Lancaster Reg. Col. Greenwalt; Lancaster Reg., Col. Lowry, Northampton Reg. Col. Ballat; Berks Reg., Col. Utree.

Mapping the Battle onto the Modern Landscape

The Battle of Brandywine was, and still is, a complex and confusing affair. *Figure 1.3* presented on the last 16 pages of the chapter, presents a more updated and detailed summary of the Battle. This figure focuses on the troop movements and identifies the modern locations where they occurred. The purpose of *Figure 1.3* is to provide the context of the Battle on the modern landscape, which is essential for historic interpretation presented in *Chapter 5*. All times and locations presented in *Figure 1.3* are approximate.


The names of British Troops (and their German mercenaries) **are printed in red**, while all American Troops (Continental Army and militias) **are in printed blue**. This figure is based on the description of the Battle as presented in Thomas McGuire's *The Philadelphia Campaign: Brandywine and the Fall of Philadelphia* (2006).⁵⁷ This figure is also based on the animated mapping from the 2010 ABPP Survey, which was also drawn from McGuire. *Figure 1.3* also includes graphics excerpted from the animated mapping.

In *Figure 1.3*, the word *troops* is used to refer to one or more battalions working in unison. If brigades fought under one commanding officer, they will be labeled using his name, such as *Cornwallis's Troops*. German troops are identified using English terms so the *Jaegers* are called *Rangers*. Units with commonly known names such as the *Queen's Rangers* and *Ferguson's Rifles* are also used. Troops that had no single commanding officer are referred to by their nationality, such as the *British 3rd Brigade*. Artillery units of all sizes are simply be called *American Cannons* or *British Cannons*. This approach is being taken because in common use the word *artillery* can refer to weapons, ammunition, or the troops who use them. In the context of the Battle it was the very cannons which were of high importance, and so they are the main focus, rather than the units who operated them.


⁵⁷ Thomas McGuire, *The Philadelphia Campaign: Brandywine and the Fall of Philadelphia* (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2006).⁵⁷

Figure 1.3: Timeline of the Battle of Brandywine


Northern Front	Western Front
Before 5:00 AM	
Cornwallis's Troops (7,000 men) line up along Unionville Road from Kennett Square to Doe Run Road. In front are Ewald's Rangers (called Jaegers, Germans) followed by the British Light Infantry Brigade, the British Grenadiers, the Hessian Rangers (Germans), the Hessian Grenadier Brigade (Germans), the British Guard Brigade, the British 3rd Brigade, the British 4th Brigade. (See map below.) Some of Hazen's Regiment (2nd Canadian, 400 men) are posted east of Buffingtons Ford at the PA 82 bridge over the Creek, and the rest at Wistar Ford at the PA 52 Bridge over the Creek. Halls Regiment (1st DE, 250 men) is posted at Jones Ford at the PA 926 Bridge over the Creek. The Chester County Militia (1st Battalion) under Col. John Hannum establishes their headquarters at Martin's Tavern in Marshalltown near Strasburg Road and Northbrook Road. They are joined by some pro-Independence civilians including Thomas "Squire" Cheyney, and by Maj. Joseph Spear of the Chester County Militia (8th Battalion).	Knyphausen's Troops (5,000 men) line up along State Street through Kennet Square from Cedar Spring Road to School House Lane. In front are the Ferguson's Rifles and the Queen's Rangers. They are followed by the British 1st Brigade, Grant's 2nd Brigade, Stirn's Hessian Brigade, the British Cannons, and the British 71st Regiment. Most of Washington's Army (14,000 to 15,000 soldiers and militia) line up on the east of the Creek, between Rocky Hill Road and Wylie Road. Lined up north to south are Sullivan's Troops (1st MD Brigade and 2nd MD Brigade); American Cannons; Stirling's Troops (3rd PA Brigade and 1st NJ Brigade); Stephen's Troops (3rd VA Brigade and 4th VA Brigade); Wayne's Troops (1st PA Brigade and 2nd PA Brigade); Greene's Troops (1st VA Brigade, 2nd VA Brigade, and 1st NC Brigade) and Armstrong's Troops (PA Militia). West of the Creek, American Cannons are lined up at Sunny Ridge Lane near Hillendale Road. A company of Maxwell's Troops (Light Infantry Brigade, 1,000 soldiers and several 100 Chester County militia), are posted at the Anvil Tavern on US 1 near Lenape Road. The rest of Maxwell's Troops are posted at the Kennett Meetinghouse on US 1 near Meetinghouse Lane.




Northern Front	Western Front
5:00 to 6:45AM – The British form Two Columns	
Cornwallis's Troops form into a column and move north along Unionville Road, then east along Marlborough Road, then north along to Red Lion Road to near Haines Road. As ordered by Gen. Washington, Maj. Joseph Spear leaves Martin's Tavern to scout for British Troops. Before sunrise, he rides south to Welch's Tavern near US 1 and Longwood Road. He sees no British Troops.	5:00: Knyphausen's Troops form into a column and move east along US 1 toward the Old Kennett Meetinghouse. At the front of the column are Ferguson's Rifles, (90 loyalists) and the Queen's Rangers (Capt. Wemys' 40th Regiment, 300 loyalists). 6:00: Near the intersection of US 1 and Lenape Road, Ferguson's Rifles and the Queen's Rifles engage fire with a company of Maxwell's Troops who withdraw east and join the rest of Maxwell's Troops. 6:30: Fire is again exchanged near the Anvil Tavern at US 1 and Kennett Pike, after which Maxwell's Troops withdraw to a location along US 1 near Hickory Road. (See map below.)




Northern Front	Western Front
7:00 to 7:45 AM – Skirmishes along US 1 as Kyphausen Moves East	
Cornwallis's Troops continue to move north along Red Lion Road to Unionville-Wawaset Road. From there, they turn west onto Bragg Hill Road. This is the road that leads to Trimble's Ford. The back end of the column of Cornwallis's Troops are still on Unionville Road near Street Road.	7:00: Ferguson's Rifles and the Queen's Rangers exchange fire with Maxwell's Troops who take cover behind the western wall of the Old Kennett Meetinghouse. Maxwell's Troops withdraw to the east along US 1. (See map below.) 7:15: At US 1 and Hickory Hill Rd, Ferguson's Rifles and the Queen's Rangers again exchange fire with Maxwell's Troops. They skirmish along US 1 near Chandler Road. 7:30: At US 1 and Sunny Ridge Lane, Ferguson's Rifles and the Queen's Rangers again exchange fire with Maxwell's Troops. To the south, American Cannons are still lined up at Sunny Ridge Lane near Hillendale Road. 7:45: Knyphausen's Troops move east along US 1 to Brintons Bridge Road. The British 1st Brigade (1,330 British) then separates from the main column, and moves north onto Brintons Bridge Road. This is the road that leads to Britons Ford.




Northern Front	Western Front
8:00 to 9:30 AM – The British Northern Column Crosses the Brandywine Creek's Branches	
Cornwallis' Troops, specifically 8,000 of Ewald's Rangers and the British Light Infantry Brigade, begin crossing the Creek's western branch at Trimble's Ford. The back end of this column of troops is still on Red Lion Road near Haines Road. 8:00: South of Martin's Tavern near Northbrook Road and Strasburg Road, Col. Hannum and Squire Cheney's witness a cloud of dust rising from Cornwallis's Troops approaching the ford from the south. Cheney rides to warn Washington who is at the Ring Road House in Chadds Ford. 9:30: Ross's Patrol (70 men) arrive in Marshallton near Martin's Tavern and begin scouting for British troops.	8:00: At US 1 and Sunny Ridge Lane, Ferguson's Rifles and the Queen's Rangers continue to exchange fire with Maxwell's Troops, who are joined by the American Cannons positioned to the south along Sunny Ridge Lane. (See map below.) 8:30: While still under fire, Maxwell's Troops withdraw east across the Creek at Chadds Ford. 9:00: The British 1st Brigade and British Cannons form a line west of Brintons Ford and north of Chaddwyk Lane. 9:30: Ferguson's Rifles form a line west of Chadds Ford. The Queen's Rangers seize the abandoned American Cannons. The rest of Knyphausen's Troops gather along US 1 from Chandler Road to Sunny Ridge Lane. Active combat in the western front comes to a stop.




Northern Front	Western Front
9:45 to 11:45 AM – Knyphausen’s Troops and Washington’s Army Line up along the Creek	
Cornwallis’s Troops continue to cross the Creek at Trimble’s Ford. They move east onto Lucky Hill Road and then Allerton Road. This road leads to Jefferis Ford. 10:45: Ross’s Patrol moves south to Northbrook and North Wawaset Roads. 11:00: The British 4th Brigade are the last of Cornwallis’s Troops to cross the Creek at Trimble’s Ford. Ross’s Patrol exchanges gunfire with the British 4th Brigade and a skirmish ensues. 11:15: Ross sends a note to Washington to report that the British have crossed the Creek and are flanking to the north. 11:45: Cornwallis’s Troops begin crossing the Creek’s eastern branch at Jefferis Ford. Howe forces Emmor Jefferis, a Quaker farmer, to guide them. The Ewald’s Rangers turn south onto Birmingham Road, while 6,000 of Cornwallis’s Troops have yet to cross at the ford.	East of Chadds Ford, Stirling’s Troops, Stephen’s Troops, Maxwell’s Troops, Greene’s Troops, and American Cannons line up along Creek Road from Masters Way south to Murphy Road. Wayne’s Troops are in the rear, near US 1 and Ring Road (Brandywine Battlefield Park). Armstrong’s Militia line up east of Pyles Ford and Gibson’s Ford, along Rocky Hill Road near Bullock Road. No British are across the Creek from Armstrong’s Militia. East of Brinton’s Ford, Sullivan’s Troops and American Cannons line up opposite the British 1st Brigade and British Cannons who are lined up west of the ford. Most of Knyphausen’s Troops line up on the west side of the Creek from Brinton’s Bridge Road south to Hillendale Road. The British 1st Brigade, Grants 2nd Brigade and the British 71st Regiment line up west of Chadds Ford along US 1. The Queen’s Rangers line up near Hillendale Road. 10:00: Washington incorrectly believes he is facing the entire British Army. He orders American Cannons at Rocky Hill Road South of Creek Road to fire a warning shot west across the Creek towards Knyphausen’s Troops. (See map below.) 10:45: Ferguson’s Rifles move north from US 1 toward Brinton’s Ford. 11:45: Squire Cheyney arrives at Chadds Ford and tells Washington that Cornwallis’s Troops are marching to the north, but Cheyney is not believed.




Northern Front	Western Front
12:00 to 1:15 PM - Washington Attacks Knyphausen's Troops	
Noon: Cornwallis's Troops continue crossing the Creek's eastern branch at Jefferis Ford. 1:00: Joseph Townsend, a member of the Birmingham Meeting, witnesses the advance of Cornwallis's Troops through Sconnelltown at Birmingham Road and Sconnelltown Road. Cornwallis's Troops halt their southern advance and begin to organize near Strode's Mill at Birmingham Road and PA 52. The British Light Infantry and the Hessian Rangers line up on the south side of PA 52 just south of Strode's Mill 1:15: Ewald's Hessian Rangers move south along Birmingham Road to near County Club Road.	Noon: Washington receives Ross's note stating that the British are to the north. He prepares to attack Knyphausen's Troops lined up west of the Creek. 12: 15: Maxwell's Troops under Maj. Gen. Greene move across the "Morass." They ford the Creek at Chadds Ford. They attack Knyphausen's Troops near Hillendale Road south of US 1. 12:30: Lt. Gen. Knyphausen orders the Queen's Rangers to attack Maxwell's Troops and fire is exchanged. Maxwell's Troops withdraw east, again fording the Creek. (See map below.) 12:45: Sullivan's Troops cross the Creek at Brinton's Ford. Ferguson's Rifles and the British 1st Brigade defend their position. American Cannons along Creek Road from Street Road to US 1 fire east across the Creek at Knyphausen's Troops. Maj. Spears delivers incorrect information to Maj. Gen. Sullivan that there are no British to the north. Sullivan delivers this information to Washington, who fearing a trap, reconsiders his strategy. 1:15: Washington orders Bland's Company north up Birmingham Road to near Meetinghouse Road where they see Cornwallis's Troops.




Northern Front	Western Front
1:30 to 2:15 PM - The British Northern Column at Osbourne Hill Prepares for Battle	
Most of Cornwallis's Troops stop to rest on Osbourne Hill north of Lenape Road and west of Birmingham Road. While they prepare for battle, the Hessian Rangers move behind Ewald's Hessian Rangers along Birmingham Road near Country Club Road. 1:30: Hazen's Regiment leaves Buffington's Ford near Creek Road and Bridge Road South, and moves south along Creek Road to Wistars Ford near Lenape Road and Creek Road. 2:15: The British Guards move to north of PA 52 near Edgemill Way. The British 3rd Brigade and the British 4th Brigade move north of PA 52 near Darlington Drive. (See map below.)	Knyphausen's Troops maintain their position lined up on the west side of the Creek from Brintons Bridge Road south to Hillendale Road. 1:45: Bland's Company quickly move south along Birmingham Road to Chadds Ford where they warn Washington that Cornwallis's Troops are marching from the north. Washington realizes that he has been flanked and begins ordering troops to move north toward Brimingham Hill. 2:00: Stirling's Troops move east more or less along Webb Road. Stephen's Troops move east along US 1 near Ring Road.




Northern Front	Western Front
2:30 to 3:30 PM - American Troops Attempt to Line up along Meetinghouse Ridge	
Most of Cornwallis's Troops maintain their position at Osbourne Hill north of Lenape Road and west of Birmingham Road. The British Guards Brigade move to just south of PA 52 near Chesterfield Farm Lane. The British 3rd Brigade and the British 4th Brigade move to an area between Lenape Road near Osage Lane and Tigie Road. Hazen's Regiment moves south along Creek Road to Jones Ford near Street Road and Creek Road. There, they join with Hall's Company. Sullivan's Troops move north on Creek Road from Meetinghouse Road to Street Road where they absorb Hazen's Regiment and Hall's Company (at 3:15). They are unable to find Strling's Troops, with whom they are supposed to form a line. Strling's Troops and Stephen's Troops move east from US 1 near Painters Crossing Road, up Harvey Run to Oakland Road, from there north up Birmingham Road to south of Meetinghouse Road. Then (at 3:15), they line up on the ridgeline south of Meetinghouse Road. (See map below.) 3:15: A Company of Stephen's Troops moves north along Birmingham Road from Wylie Road to just south of Street Road, and are met by Ewald's Hessian Rangers who had just moved south along Birmingham Road from Ashwell Lane, and are now standing just north of Street Road.	Knyphausen's Troops (5,000 men) maintain their position lined up on the west side of the Creek from Brintons Bridge Road south to Hillendale Road. Nearly half of Washington's Army (8,000 men) maintain their position lined up on the east side of the Creek. American Cannons are aimed west across the Creek along Creek Road between Brintons Bridge Road and US 1. Wayne's Troops are along US 1 east of Chadds Ford. American Cannons and Greene's Troops are south of there, along Bullock Road near Rocky Hill Road. Armstrong's Militia are east of Pyles Ford and Gibson's Ford, along Rocky Hill Road near Bullock Road. No British are across the Creek from them.




Northern Front	Western Front
3:45 to 4:30 PM - The British Northern Column Lines up South of Radley Run	
Conwallis's Troops unite to form a single line south of Radley Run, in the area of Birminham, Road Lenape Road, County Club Road Road and Tigue Road. 3:45: A company of Stirling's Troops exchanges fire with the Ewald's Rangers, who move west along Street Road to near Gen. Lafayette Blvd. 4:15: American Cannons are moved to the center of the American line (4,000 men) along Birmingham Road just east of Wylie Road. To make room for them, Stephen's Troops move east toward New Street. American Cannons are moved to New Street near Militia Hill, and are fired. 4:30: Sullivan's Troops, still trying to line up with Stirling's Troops, move east along Street Road, then turn southeast to Meetinghouse Road where the roadway bends. (See map below.)	There is no change in either American or British troop positions.




Northern Front	Western Front
4:45 to 5:00 PM - The British Northern Line Marches South to Street Road	
The British 3rd Brigade maintains their rear position along Birmingham Road near County Club Road. The Hessian Grenadier Brigade and the British 4th Brigade maintain their rear position along Birmingham Road near Radley Run. The rest of Cornwallis's Troops attack, moving south as a line from Radley Run to Street Road. The American Cannons along New Street near Militia Hill are fired. (See map below.) Sullivan's Troops, still trying to line up with Stirling's Troops, reverse direction and move west, then southeast, finally approaching Stirling's Troops lined up north of Wylie Run.	There is little change to the American troop position, except that Greene's Troops move northeast from the area north of Bullock Road and Ring Road, to US 1 near Harvey Road. There is little change to the position of Kyphausen's Troops, except that Ferguson's Rifles move from Brinton's Bridge Road, south to US 1 near Sunny Ridge Lane. Meanwhile the Queen's Rangers move east from Hillendale Road toward the Creek.




Northern Front	Western Front
5:15 to 5:30 PM - The British Attack on both the Northern and Western Fronts	
The British 3rd Brigade maintains their rear position along Birmingham Road near County Club Road. The Hessian Grenadiers, the British 3rd Brigade, and the British 4th Brigade move south along Birmingham Road from near Radley Run to Street Road. The rest of Cornwallis's Troops attack, moving south as a line from Radley Run to Meetinghouse road. Heavy fire is exchanged between them and the combined forces of Stirling's Troops and Stephen's Troops who are north of Wylie Run. The American Cannons along New Street near Militia Hill are fired and withdrawn, but Stirling's Troops and Stephen's Troops hold their ground. 5:15: Sullivan's Troops fail to line up with Stirling's Troops, because they are attacked by the British Guards. Sullivan's Troops return fire while out of position, but then retreat south from Wylie Run to Brintons Bridge Road. (<i>See map below.</i>) 5:30: The British Guard Troops pursue Sullivan's Troops moving south from Meetinghouse Road to Wylie Run. In so doing, the British Guard Troops flank the left side of the American's lines. Stirling's Troops who are already taking fire from in front, are now vulnerable to face fire from the British Guard Troops who have moved to their left.	Kyphausen's Troops attack, moving east across the Creek. British Cannons and American Cannons exchange fire across the Creek. South of US 1, the Queen's Rangers ford the Creek and attack Maxwell's Troops. Fire is exchanged. Wayne's Troops hold their ground along US 1 between Creek Road and Webb Road. American Cannons continue to fire. 5:15: Greene's Troops move northeast towards Dilworthtown from near Haybourne Road to near Oakland Road and Harvey Road. Armstrong's Troops move northeast from Rocky Hill Road near Bullock Road to north of Bullock Roar near Ring Road. 5:30: American Troops on the Western Front begin to retreat.




Northern Front	Western Front
5:45 to 6:15 PM - The American Army Begins a Disorganized Retreat	
5:45: Sullivan's Troops retreat east along Briton's Bridge Road from Penns Way to Cherry Farm Lane with the British Guard Troops pursuing them. They then change direction. They move west along Wylie Creek, then south entering the Western Front. 6:00: Some of Stephen's Troops (4th VA Brigade) retreat south along New Street from Militia Hill Road, and then east along Birmingham Road to Britons Bridge Road. The rest of Stephen's Troops (3rd VA Brigade) exchange heavy fire with Cornwallis's Troops (Hessian Rangers), but then retreat down Radley Run east of South New Street. 6:15: Some of Stirling's Troops (1st NJ Brigade) retreat southeast from Wylie Road and Firethorn Drive to Webb Road near Oakland Road. The rest of Stirling's Troops (PA 3rd Brigade) continue to exchange heavy fire with Cornwallis's Troops (the Light Infantry Battalion and the Hessian Rangers), along Birmingham Road west of South New Street. (See map below.) While the sun sets, some of Greene's Troops (Weedon's 2nd VA Battalion) form a line south of Chester Creek West Branch near Old Barn Drive, to fire at the left side of advancing British.	5:45: The Queen's Rangers, Ferguson's Rifles, and the British 71st Regiment ford the Creek under fire south of US 1. They exchange fire with Maxwell's Militia Troops and Wayne's Troops along US 1 near Creek Road and Webb Road. Gen. Washington, Brig. Gen. Knox, Count Pulaski, and headquarters staff withdraw northeast toward Dilworthtown. Washington stops near the 1704 House, and orders a defensive line to be formed to protect the retreating troops. He gives command of his personal body guard to Pulaski, and orders them to attack Cornwallis's Troops so as to slow their advance. 6:00: The British Guard Troops previously at the Northern Front, move south along Creek Road to Britons Bridge Road near Britons Ford. They attack the American Cannons near there. The American Cannons are then abandoned (at 6:15). 6:15: Greene's Troops continue to move northeast from near Oakland Road and Harvey Road to US 202, east of its intersection with Oakland Road. Armstrong's Militia Troops retreat east along US 1 from Ring Road to east of US 202 heading toward the Concord Meetinghouse.



Northern Front	Western Front
6:30 to 7:00 PM - British Troops Take Control of the Western Front	
6:30: After the last of Sterling's Troops (PA 3rd Brigade) retreat from Meetinghouse Road, Pulaski leads Washington's personal bodyguard on a brief attack on the now tired British Troops near Brintons Bridge Road and Oakland Road. This action slows the British advance, allowing American Troops in the area to regroup. The American Troops left fighting on the Northern Front withdraw or retreat. Sullivan's Troops, followed by some of Stephen's Troops (3rd VA Brigade) and some of Stirling's Troops (3rd PA Brigade) retreat east along Dilworthtown Road from Birmingham Road then turn south on Thornton Road to near Cross-Fire Road. 6:45: The rest of Stirling's Troops (Scott's 4th VA Brigade) and American Cannons withdraw, reorganize, and form a line along Web Road from Biddle Brook Lane to Oakland Road. They attack some of Cornwallis's Troops (the British 4th Brigade), and fire is exchanged. 7:00: Some of Cornwallis's Troops (the British 4th Brigade and the some of the British 2nd Grenadier Brigade), move south along Oakland Road from Brintons Bridge Road to Webb Road. Stirling's Troops (Scott's 4th VA Brigade) and American Cannons withdraw to an area south of Harvey Road and Oakland Road. (See map below.)	6:30: Knyphausen's Troops begin to ford the Creek at Chadds Ford, while Wayne's Troops and American Cannons retreat east along US 1 from Webb Road to west of Painters Crossing Drive. American Cannons near Masters Road and Creek Road continue to fire across the Creek at Knyphausen's Troops, but then are abandoned. 6:45: Following Wayne's retreat, Knyphausen's Troops take control of the entire western front. Combat along the Creek comes to a stop.



Northern Front	Western Front
7:15 to 7:45 PM - Greene's Rearguard Defense Ends the British Attack on the Retreating American 7:15: While the sunlight is fading, Maj. Gen. Greene takes command of some of Stirling's Troops (Scott's 4th VA Brigade), and some American Cannons. Then he joins them with his own troops (1st VA Brigade, Weedon's 2nd VA Brigade, and the 1st NC Brigade), who had already organized into a line. These four brigades are now Greene's Troops. They form a concave line of defense that extends from Brandywine Drive east of US 202, across US 202 west of Oakland Road, northwest to Old Barn Drive. The last of Cornwallis's Troops still engaged in active combat (the British 4th Brigade and the some of the British 2nd Grenadier Brigade), pursue the retreating American Troops. Cornwallis's Troops move to Oakland Road and Webb Road directly in front of Greene's Troops. Heavy fire is exchanged. Cornwallis's Troops suffer heavy casualties and are forced to stop. (<i>See map below.</i>) 7:30: After Cornwallis's Troops are stopped, Greene's Troops withdraw to the east, scattering independently of each other. The rest of Washington's Army forms a column and conducts an organized retreat east along US 1 toward the Concord Meetinghouse, with the exception of Maxwell's Troops, who remain along US 1, east of US 202 as a rear guard.	
Knyphausen's Troops continue to cross the Creek at Chadds Ford and control US 1 from the Creek to Ring Road near Brandywine Battlefield Park.	



Northern Front	Western Front
8:00 to 9:15 PM - Greene's Troops Retreat and the British Army forms Two Camps	
In the darkness, Greene's Troops who were scattered, reform into a column and conduct an orderly retreat from US 202 and Oakland Road, south to US 1 and State Farm Road. From there they join the rest of Washington's Army retreating east along us 202 toward Concord Meetinghouse. Maxwell's Troops remain west of US 202 until 8:00, when they too retreat east. 8:30: Cornwallis's Troops unite and form a camp of a rectangular form. Its length extends from Webb Road and Biddle Brook Lane, east to Oakland Road. Its width extends from Webb Road south to Harvey Road and Glenn Knoll Drive.	8:45: Knyphausen's Troops unite and form a camp of a rectangular form. Its length extends from US 1 and Webb Road east to Harvey Road, and its width extends from US 1 north to Atwater Road and Hickory Lane. (See map below.)

